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Abstract
Hilbert’s program of establishing consistency of theories like Peano arithmetic
PA using only finitary tools has long been considered impossible. The standard
reference here is Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem by which a theory T , if
consistent, cannot prove the arithmetical formula ConT , “for all x, x is not a code of
a proof of a contradiction in T .” We argue that such arithmetization of consistency
distorts the problem. ConT is stronger than the original notion of consistency, hence
Go¨del’s theorem does not yield impossibility of proving consistency by finitary tools.
We consider consistency in its standard form “no sequence of formulas S is a
derivation of a contradiction.” Using partial truth definitions, for each derivation
S in PA we construct a finitary proof that S does not contain 0 = 1. This estab-
lishes consistency for PA by finitary means and vindicates, to some extent, Hilbert’s
consistency program. This also suggests that in the arithmetical form, consistency,
similar to induction, reflection, truth, should be represented by a scheme rather
than by a single formula.
1 Introduction
1.1 Consistency problem: lost in translation
The standard formulation of consistency for a theory T is
“no sequence of formulas S is a derivation of a contradiction.” (1)
Hilbert’s consistency program of the 1920s (cf. [31]) asked for a finitary demonstration
of (1).1 Provided “finitary” is given a precise mathematical meaning, this becomes a
1Hilbert explained his views in many occasions. This formulation is taken from the article ”Hilbert’s
Program” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [31].
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mathematical problem about finite sequences of formulas. In its original form, the problem
is not concerned with arithmetization, proof codes, internalized quantifiers, etc.
We argue that the impossibility of finitary proofs of consistency, usually attributed to
Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem, G2, is largely a myth based on an uncritical
metamathematical interpretation of its mathematical result.
Formal derivations are finite sequences of formulas. Go¨del’s arithmetization numeri-
cally encodes those derivations. This first part of the arithmetization process is acceptable
due to unproblematic coding/decoding procedures. However, the next step of arithmeti-
zation, that of using numeric quantifiers to represent universal properties of derivations,
introduces serious aberrations. For example, arithmetical formula ConT ,
for all x, x is not a code of a proof of a contradiction in T , (2)
in a provability context, does not represent consistency expressed in (1) fairly.
From the “normal” mathematical point of view, ConT is true iff T is consistent. For
a logician, ConT holds in the standard model of arithmetic iff T is consistent. However,
in Hilbert’s consistency program we are interested in provability of this formula in PA
hence we have to analyze validity of ConT in all models of PA, most of them nonstan-
dard. In a given nonstandard model, the universal quantifier “for all x” spills over to
nonstandard/infinite numbers, and hence ConT states consistency of both standard and
nonstandard proof codes. This is too strong for (1) which speaks exclusively about se-
quences S of formulas and such sequences have only standard integer codes. So, G2’s
finding that PA cannot prove ConT , does not actually block finitary consistency proofs for
standard derivations as formulated in (1).
Factoring the informal universal quantifier “any finite sequence S” from (1) into the
language of PA, thereby making it an internalized quantifier, has distorted the founda-
tional picture and made consistency unprovable for a nonessential reason. The language
of PA is too weak to sort out fake codes. This feature appears to have nothing to do
with fundamental finitary constraints on mathematical reasoning, but rather is a logical
technicality.
Here is one more argument why ConT is not an appropriate form of consistency for
Hilbert’s program. Provability in PA is often regarded as the litmus test for finitary
provability hence Hilbert’s condition of finitary provability of consistency of T , for T = PA
reads as
provability of consistency of PA in PA. (3)
Suppose consistency of PA is fairly represented by a single formula, e.g., ConPA. Then (3)
transforms into
provability of ConPA in PA
which, by compactness of provability, is equivalent to
provability of ConPA in some finite fragment of PA.
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This corresponds to
provability of consistency of PA in some finite fragment of PA (4)
as a goal of Hilbert’s program concerning PA.
Even before we learned that PA was not finitely axiomatizable, (4) appeared strictly
stronger than (3), since otherwise we would have had to tacitly assume that PA was
finitely axiomatizable, at least with respect to consistency questons. That assumption
was simply unfounded. Now we know that PA is not finitely axiomatizable. Hence no
finite fragment of PA can even observe the whole of PA, let alone analyze its consistency.
In light of this, (4) manifests itself as a distorted and inadequate version of (3). Clearly,
then, viewing ConPA as a fair interpretation of Hilbert’s consistency has never been well-
principled.
This flaw in arithmetization of consistency, namely, formalizing Hilbert’s consistency
as a single arithmetical formula, is corrected in Section 1.2 and Section 1.3, in which we
argue for representing consistency by a scheme rather than by a single formula.
There is nothing mathematically wrong with Go¨del’s consistency formula, ConT , and
the Second Incompleteness Theorem. They are valuable mathematical tools for studying
non-provability and independence, but the connection with the original consistency (1)
has been lost. These considerations show that G2 is remote from Hilbert’s consistency
problem and suggest considering the original mathematical formulation (1) of consistency
rather than its arithmetizations.
This is what we do in this paper.
1.2 What is actually done
Mathematically, Hilbert’s consistency question is a problem to establish for each finite
sequence S of formulas that
S is not a derivation of a contradiction in T (5)
and we offer a mathematical solution for T = PA.
By direct finitary reasoning in Section 5, for any given finite sequence of arithmetical
sentences S, we establish that
S is not a derivation of 0=1 in PA. (6)
In the case when S is not a PA-derivation, (6) holds vacuously. For any PA-derivation S,
a standard partial truth definition analysis bounded by complexity of formulas from S
establishes by finitary means that S does not contain 0=1.
This is a rigorous mathematical proof which answers Hilbert’s consistency question
for the case of Peano arithmetic. To ensure that this reasoning is finitary, we can check
that for each S, the corresponding consistency proof p(S) is formalizable in PA which
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follows from well-known properties of partial truth-definitions, cf. [11]. From the proof
in Section 5 we can extract a finite algorithm for constructing p(S) for each S (or for its
code); the same proof serves as a verification of this algorithm.
The reader more interested in results and less in the motivation, discussion, and con-
texts thereof, may proceed directly to Section 5.
1.3 Logician’s perspective
Let us discuss how this result fits with the existing proof theory of PA. For this we can
consider what we call “a posteriori arithmetization” of the proof. This arithmetization
is not needed for the argument and findings, but helps a logician to make sense of what
just happened and, in particular, at what point we deviated from the G2 path.
The consistency condition (5) can be equivalently represented by an arithmetical
scheme ConST (n):
n is not a code of a proof of a contradiction in T , (7)
with an integer parameter n.
Working with well-defined schemes of syntactic objects appears to be a norm in trusted
fintary reasoning: numerals as sequences of strokes, formulas and terms in logic, induction
scheme in PA, reflection schemes, etc. We do not reject studying Peano arithmetic within
finitary domains just because it takes infinitely many induction formulas to axiomatize.
As usual, we say that a scheme is provable iff each instance of a scheme is provable.
In particular, the consistency scheme (7) is provable in PA iff
for each number n, PA ⊢ ConST (n).
Here “for each n” is a mathematically clean external universal quantifier.
We are not suggesting a kind of ω-rule to make ConPA provable since the problem
is with the formula ConPA itself rather than with its unprovability in PA. In this case,
it appears to be sufficient to prove all the premises of the ω-rule without the need to
formalize its conclusion.
So, the answer to the question of how we dodged G2 is that when proving consistency
of PA, we do not consider ConPA at all.
1. We don’t need it, since Hilbert’s consistency problem for PA is about finite sequences
of formulas, not about codes and internalized quantifiers. We were able to solve the
problem directly without arithmetization.
2. We don’t want it, since ConPA is too strong for the standard consistency of PA.
Both consistency formula ConPA and consistency scheme ConSPA(n) are arithmetiza-
tions of the notion of consistency. We have argued that ConPA fails as a fair representation
of that notion, while ConSPA(n) is more successful. Notions of mathematical induction,
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arithmetical truth, and others admit of arithmetization as a scheme of formulas, but not
as a single arithmetical formula. Just as we have been able to come to terms with this
in the cases of induction and truth, we suggest consistency be considered similarly. It is
time to learn to live with formal consistency as an arithmetical scheme.
1.4 Foundational findings
Despite a long history of suggestions to bypass G2 (cf. [14, 15, 16, 31]), this schematic
approach to representing and proving consistency appears to be novel and well-principled.
This vindicates, to some extent, Hilbert’s program of establishing consistency of formal
theories and thus reopens the door to the study of similar consistency proofs for other
theories.
Historically, the idea of using schemes of formulas to represent consistency came from
Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov semantics [12, 28] and its formalization in the Logic of
Proofs [3, 5, 6]. In this paper we also study connections of consistency arithmetiza-
tions with provability semantics, constructive truth/falsity of arithmetical sentences and
constructive consistency “for each x, there is a PA-proof that x is not a proof of a con-
tradiction,” cf. Section 6.
By no means are we casting doubt upon Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorems, ordinal
analysis, etc.; these are the classics of mathematical logic. However, as far as foundations
are concerned, viewing Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorems as excluding the very possibil-
ity of proving consistency internally is an unfortunate misconception which we suggest
resisting.
Representation of consistency by the arithmetical formula ConT has distorted the
original notion of consistency. The unprovability of ConT is caused by a mere technicality,
namely, the internalized universal quantifier, rather than by deeper foundational problems.
Once consistency is considered in its original combinatorial form without unnecessary
and dubious arithmetization of the quantifier, its finitary proofs for Peano arithmetic PA
suggest themselves.
In the arithmetical form, consistency, similar to induction, reflection, truth, should be
represented by a scheme (7) rather than by a single formula.
Our starting point was the foundational problem in its entirety:
Can mathematics establish its own consistency? (8)
The prevailing wisdom so far has been “No, by Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem,
unless mathematics is inconsistent.” We offer a new foundational answer to (8):
Yes, for PA. The question remains open in general. (9)
Likewise, the answer to Hilbert’s question whether consistency can be established by
finitary means has changed from “No, by G2” to (9).
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2 Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov semanitcs
According to traditional Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov (BHK) semantics, cf. [12],
• a proof of A→ B is a construction which, given a proof of A, returns a proof of B.
Notoriously, this yields weird properties of negation:
1. trivialization: ¬A holds for any non-provable A, no real witness of ¬A is required;
2. irrelevance of witnesses : if ¬A holds, then any p is a dummy BHK-proof of ¬A.
Indeed, a BHK-proof of ¬A is a BHK-proof of A→⊥, i.e., a construction p which, given
a proof x of A returns a proof p(x) of ⊥. Since, by definition, ⊥ does not have a proof,
this condition holds whenever A does not have a proof. Furthermore, once A does not
have a proof, then any p fits the description of a BHK-proof for A→⊥.
These features, trivialization and irrelevance of witnesses, are counterintuitive and
undermine basic principles of constructive semantics; they were subject of criticism by
Kreisel, so-called Kreisel’s second clause (cf. [13]). Later formalizations of BHK semantics
have offered a meaningful patch consistent with Kreisel’s suggestions.
Go¨del in [19] endorsed classical modal logic S4 as the calculus of provability in which
✷A informally represents ‘A is provable’:
• Axioms and rules of classical propositional logic,
• ✷(F→G)→ (✷F→✷G),
• ✷F→F ,
• ✷F→✷✷F ,
• Rule of Necessitation:
⊢ F
⊢ ✷F
.
Go¨del connected classical provability with intuitionistic logic IPC in a way that respects
the provability reading of the latter:
IPC ⊢ F iff S4 ⊢ tr(F ),
where tr(F ) is obtained by ‘boxing’ each subformula of F . At that stage, a provability
semantics for IPC seemed to reduce to a provability semantics for S4. However, as it was
noticed by Go¨del, S4 endorses the reflection principle
✷F→F,
not compatible with the straightforward reading of ✷ as formal provability.
The main idea to overcome this difficulty was to use the language of explicit proof
terms and a logic of proofs in lieu of modal language for provability and S4. Indeed, if p:F
6
is the proof formula ‘p is a proof of F ,’ then the explicit version of factivity is internally
provable
PA ⊢ p:F→F.
In the Logic of Proofs LP, cf. [3, 5, 6], proofs are represented by proof terms constructed
from proof variables and proof constants by means of functional symbols for elementary
computable operations on proofs, binary ·, +, and unary !. Formulas are built by Boolean
connectives from propositional atoms and those of the form t:F where t is a proof term
and F is a formula.
LP has the axioms and rules of classical logic along with:
• t:A→A reflection
• t:(A→B)→ (s:A→ [t·s]:B) application
• t:A→ [t + s]:A, s:A→ [t + s]:A sum
• t:A→ !t:t:A proof checker
• Axiom Necessitation: if A is an axiom and c a proof constant, derive c:A.
The principal feature of LP is its natural arithmetical semantics, according to which
t:F is interpreted as ‘t is a proof of F .’
Furthermore, LP has the ability to realize all S4 theorems by restoring corresponding
proof terms inside occurrences of modality. A forgetful projection of an LP-formula F is
a modal formula obtained by replacing all assertions t:(·) in F by ✷(·). The following
Proposition 1 a.k.a. Realization Theorem, was first established in [2, 3] (cf. [18] for an
alternative proof).
Proposition 1 S4 is the forgetful projection of LP.
That the forgetful projection of LP is S4-compliant is a straightforward observation. The
converse has been established in [2, 3] by presenting an algorithm which substitutes proof
terms for all occurrences of modalities in a cut-free Gentzen-style S4-derivation of a for-
mula F , thereby producing a formula F r derivable in LP. The resulting realization respects
Skolem’s idea that negative occurrences of existential quantifiers over proofs (hidden in
the modality of provability) are realized by proof variables whereas positive occurrences
are realized by functions of those variables.
Realization Theorem provides an exact semantics for S4 in LP. To complete building
a provability BHK semantics for IPC it is now sufficient to note that LP has a natural
interpretation as a logic of formal proofs in Peano arithmetic PA (or a similar system
capable of encoding its own proofs):
IPC →֒ S4 →֒ LP →֒ PA,
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where each →֒ is an embedding.
Realization Theorem takes reasoning in S4 and automatically produces the corre-
sponding LP-reasoning.
Let us try to view the negation problem in the original BHK through this prizm. Let
A be atomic. In the original BHK setting, ¬A, which is A→⊥, holds iff ✷A→✷⊥, i.e.,
equivalently in S4,
¬✷A.
This means ‘A has no proofs ’ and yields the aforementioned trivialization and irrelevance
of witnesses distortions.
In the S4/LP-based BHK, we first Go¨del-translate ¬A:
✷¬✷A.
Then we realize the result in LP respecting polarities:
v(x):¬x:A
for some proof term v(x). This reads
v(x) is a proof that x is not a proof of A.
Such adjusted semantics cures trivialization and irrelevance of witnesses defects.
Coincidentally, S4/LP-based BHK semantics of negation and implication is compliant
with the Kreisel “second clause” criticism (cf. [6, 13]). In a general BHK setting, the
suggested refining of the BHK clause for implication is
• a proof of A→B is a pair of constructions (p, v) such that v(x) verifies that if x is
a proof x of A, then p(x) is a proof of B.
3 Constructive truth, falsity and consistency
Can an intuitionistic approach provide new insights on what is constructive in classical
mathematics?
As usual, we will ignore difference between a syntactic object X , its Go¨del number
pXq and the corresponding arithmetical numeral pXq when safe. Let t:Y be a shorthand
for the standard formula Proof (t, Y ) stating that ‘t is a proof of Y in PA,’ ✷Y stand for
Provable(Y ), i.e., ∃x(x:Y ). For details, cf. [10, 20, 21, 26, 27].
We use ⊥ for the propositional constant “false” which in the arithmetical context can
be equivalently read as 0=1. We stay on the common sense mathematical ground which
assumes soundness of PA with respect to the standard model of arithmetic.
Traditionally, intuitionism reads an arithmetical sentence F in a constructive manner.
This however could alter the meaning of F . Our idea is to preserve the classical meaning
of F . For a BHK-style interpretation, so we treat F as atomic and don’t venture “inside”
F .
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Definition 1 An arithmetical sentence F is constructively true iff
PA ⊢ F.
Informally, F should be BHK-true as an intuitionistic atom. By S4/LP realization, this
means that PA proves t:F for some t which is equivalent to PA ⊢ F .
F is constructively false iff
PA ⊢ ∀x✷¬x:F. (10)
Conceptually, we read ‘F yields ⊥’ intuitionistically in a BHK fashion and conclude that
for some v(x),
PA ⊢ ∀x v(x):¬x:F (11)
By some proof theory, (10) is equivalent to ‘(11) holds for some provably total computable
term v(x).’ Indeed, (11) obvioulsy yields (10). Now assume (10). We can describe v(x)
informally. Since u:F is decidable, given x, enumerate proofs in PA until a proof of ¬x:F
is met. Since PA ⊢ ∀x∃y(y:¬x:F ), v(x) is provably total.
Assume that theory T provably contains PA and let ‘✷T ’ and ‘:T ’ denote provability
and proof predicates respectively for T . Go¨del’s consistency formula, ConT , is
ConT = ∀x¬x:T⊥.
Definition 2 Constructive consistency of T is a formula CConT stating that for each
number, PA proves that it is not a proof of a contradiction in T :
CConT = ∀x✷PA¬x:T⊥.
In particular, CConPA = ∀x✷PA¬x:PA⊥ or, for short,
CConPA = ∀x✷¬x:⊥.
The name “constructive consistency of T” is self-explanatory: it expresses the idea that
consistency of each derivation x in T is confirmed constructively by a corresponding PA-
proof. Besides, constructive consistency of PA is a special case of a formula from the
constructive falsity condition (10).
Both ConT and CConT are arithmetical formulas which are true iff T is consistent and
in this respect they both naturally express consistency of T . However, they have different
provability behavior. By G2, PA does not prove ConPA.
The following Proposition 2 is a special instance of so-called “constructive falsity”
of refutable formulas, Theorem 2(2). It is also an easy corollary of Feferman’s general
observation concerning reflection principles in [17], Lemma 2.18, cf. also [8], Lemma
2.2(ii). Its proof is both easy and instructive so we duplicate it here.
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Proposition 2 PA proves its own constructive consistency:
PA ⊢ CConPA.
Proof. First, we check that
PA ⊢ ✷⊥→CConPA.
Indeed, note that PA ⊢ ✷⊥→✷¬x:⊥. By generalization,
PA ⊢ ✷⊥→∀x✷¬x:⊥ (= CConPA).
Furthermore,
PA ⊢ ¬✷⊥→CConPA.
Indeed, by first-order logic, PA ⊢ x:⊥→∃x(x:⊥), hence
PA ⊢ ¬✷⊥→¬x:⊥.
By Σ1-completeness of PA, cf. [27], PA ⊢ ¬x:F→✷¬x:F , hence PA ⊢ ¬✷⊥→✷¬x:⊥. By
generalization,
¬✷⊥→∀x✷¬x:⊥ (= CConPA).
✷
To the extent to which constructive consistency CConPA is acceptable as a formalization
of the notion of consistency of PA, Proposition 2 removes Go¨del’s impossibility spell from
the idea of proving consistency internally. However, Proposition 2 alone does not provide
a finitary consistency proof for PA. We discuss these foundational matters in Section 4.
4 Hilbert’s consistency program
Hilbert’s original consistency (1) (which we call H-consistency to distinguish it from its
arithmetization) for PA is not directly formalizable by a single arithmetical formula in
which derivations in PA are represented by their codes since standard natural numbers
are not definable in PA. So, Hilbert’s question concerning PA can be formulated as
Is H-consistency of PA provable by finitary means? (12)
4.1 Unprovability of ConPA is not an answer
Despite widespread opinion, G2 does not answer (12). The consistency formula for PA
ConPA = ∀x¬x:⊥, yields H-consistency but not the other way around. Semantically,
∀x¬x :⊥ claims that in no model (possibly nonstandard) of PA is there any number
(possibly nonstandard) that encodes a proof of a contradiction. So, ConPA is a uniform
consistency statement. This is, in fact, stronger than H-consistency since H-consistency
can be established by finitary means, cf. Section 5, while ConPA cannot.
By G2, there is no finitary proof of ConPA but since ConPA is stronger than H-
consistency, this impossibility does not extend to the latter.
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4.2 Provability of CConPA in PA is not an answer either
By G2, ∀x¬x:⊥ is not internally provable. So, there is no p such that
PA ⊢ p:∀x¬x:⊥.
Constructive consistency offers a more flexible approach: it allows the aforementioned
certification p to depend on x, p = p(x) and we can ask whether
PA ⊢ ∀x p(x):¬x:⊥.
In a general form this is a question of whether
PA ⊢ ∀x∃y(y:¬x:⊥),
i.e.
PA ⊢ CConPA
which was answered affirmatively in Proposition 2.
However, the argument
H-consistency of PA is finitarily provable because PA ⊢ CConPA
is circular since it relies on soundness of PA and hence does not actually prove H-
consistency of PA. After all, any inconsistent T proves its own constructive consistency.
So, Proposition 2 does not produce a real mathematical proof of H-consistency.
In a formalization process we take a mathematical proof and formalize it as a formal
derivation in a given theory. If such a formalization is possible, then a correct mathemat-
ical proof yields a correct formal derivation.
With PA ⊢ CConPA we face the opposite problem, deformalization: given that a
statement is formally provable in a theory T , produce a rigorous mathematical proof of this
statement. This does not necessarily work, e.g., when T is inconsistent, or T is not sound,
like T = PA+¬ConPA, etc. Deformalization can work when T is sound, but the assumption
of soundness of T is stronger than the goal, H-consistency of T . So deformalization is
useless for proving H-consistency and we have to do it in the reverse order: a mathematical
proof of H-consistency first, and its formalization, if needed, second.
4.3 Sufficient conditions for finitary consistency proofs
To establish H-consistency of PA by finitary tools one has
1. for each PA-derivation S to provide a mathematical proof that S does not contain
0=1;
2. check that all constructions and their properties used in the proof are finitary. In
the current context, this requirement is often interpreted as “formalizable in PA.”2
2Cf. [31] for other reading of “finitary.” Our proof satisfies all those criteria.
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Alone, neither of 1 nor 2 is sufficient for claiming a finitary proof of H-consistency.
Indeed, the provability of constructive consistency as demonstrated in Proposition 2,
though formally finitary, does not provide a mathematical proof that no derivation in
PA derives a contradiction; it rather shows that constructive consistency holds in PA
regardless to whether PA is consistent or not.
The usual soundness-in-the-standard-model argument proves H-consistency and hence
satisfies 1, but uses tools not formalizable in PA, and hence does not satisfy 2. Indeed,
all axioms of PA are true in the standard model of arithmetic, the logical rules respect
arithmetical truth, hence 0 = 1 being not true cannot be derived in PA. This is a valid
mathematical argument which is quite sufficient for a “normal” mathematician. However,
it speaks about “truth in the standard model” which is not formalizable in PA due to
limited expressiveness of the first-order language (which for a “normal” mathematician
might look like a mere technicality).
5 Finitary proof of Hilbert’s consistency for PA
Since neither of the single-formula arithmetical presentations of consistency helps to an-
swer Hilbert’s question (12), we turn to the original formulation of H-consistency (1) and
regard it as a mathematical combinatorial problem about finite sequences of formulas and
formal derivations. Once we have avoided arithmetization, finitary mathematical proofs
of H-consistency readily suggest themselves. Here is one.
In metamathematics of the first-order arithmetic, there is a well-known construction
called partial truth definitions, cf. [11, 20, 21, 24, 27]. Namely, for each n = 0, 1, 2, . . . we
inductively build a Σn+1 formula
Trn(x, y)
called truth definition for Σn formulas which satisfies natural properties of a truth pred-
icate. When ϕ is a Σn-formula and y is a sequence encoding values of the parameters in
ϕ then Trn(pϕq, y) defines the truth value of ϕ on y.
Let y be a code of a finite sequence of numbers and yi denote the i-th number in y.
Then the following conditions hold ([11, 20, 21, 24, 27]):
Proposition 3
• Trn(pϕq, y) satisfies the usual properties of truth with respect to boolean connectives,
quantifiers, and rule Modus Ponens for each ϕ ∈ Σn, and these properties are
naturally derivable using Σn+1 induction.
• PA naturally proves Tarksi’s condition for any Σn-formula ϕ:
Trn(pϕq, y) ≡ ϕ(y1, y2, . . . , yk).
In particular, ¬Trn(p0=1q) is naturally provable.
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• Trn(pAq, y) is naturally provable for any axiom A of PA of depth ≤ n.
Note that all the proofs in Proposition 3 are valid finitary arguments, which are
mathematically rigorous by their own natural merits. So, Proposition 3 does not make
any metamathematical assumptions about PA, and just uses a formal language of PA for
bookkeeping.
Given a finite sequence S of formulas which is a legitimate PA-derivation, we first
calculate n such that all formulas from S have depth ≤ n. Then, by mathematical
induction on the length of S, we check that for any formula ϕ in S with parameters y,
the property Trn(pϕq, y) holds. This is an immediate corollary of Proposition 3, since all
PA-axioms satisfy Trn and each instance of Modus Ponens respects Trn as well. So, Trn
serves as an invariant for all formulas from S. Since, by Proposition 3, 0 = 1 does not
satisfy Trn, 0=1 cannot occur in S.
We argue that this reasoning satisfies conditions for a finitary proof of H-consistency.
1. This is a mathematical proof by normal standards of rigor acceptable for a general
mathematician.
2. The constructions and required properties used in this argument are formalizable
in PA: partial truth definitions, compliance of truth definitions with PA-derivation
rules, etc. Hence for each PA-derivation S, we have proved in PA that S does not
contain 0=1.
6 Proof theory of constructive truth and falsity
In this section we consider a posteriori arithmetizations of some conceptual notions con-
sidered above and study their proof theory. Though these considerations are not expected
to provide new foundational answers with respect to Hilbert’s consistency, they open the
door to new proof theoretical studies and provide a useful context for reasoning about
foundational matters.
6.1 Normal forms
First, we find a provably equivalent quantifier-free formulation of constructive falsity
which we call “normal forms.”
The negation of the constructive falsity sentence,
∃x¬✷¬x:F, (13)
is a kind of a provability predicate which is true iff F is provable. The details will be clear
after the following
13
Lemma 1 PA ⊢ (13)↔ ¬✷⊥ ∧ ✷F .
Proof. Argue in PA. (13)→¬✷⊥ is straightforward. To check (13)→✷F assume ¬✷F ,
i.e., ∀x¬x:F . By Σ1-completeness of PA,
¬x:F→✷¬x:F,
by generalization and some first-order reasoning,
∀x¬x:F→∀x✷¬x:F.
Hence ∀x✷¬x:F which is ¬(13). This proves the “→ ” direction.
Now assume ¬✷⊥ and ✷F . Then ∃x(x:F ) and, by Σ1-completeness, ∃x✷x:F . Let t
be such an x, i.e., ✷t:F . We claim that ¬✷¬t:F , since otherwise we would have ✷t:¬F
and ✷t:F which yields ✷⊥. So, ∃x¬✷¬x:F . ✷
Theorem 1 [Normal Form Theorem] F is constructively false iff
PA ⊢ ConPA→¬✷F.
Proof. By definition, F is constructively false iff PA ⊢ ¬(13) which, by Lemma 1, is
equivalent to PA ⊢ ¬✷⊥→¬✷F , i.e., PA ⊢ ConPA→¬✷F .
✷
Equivalently F is constructive falsity iff PA ⊢ ✷F→✷⊥.
6.2 Sanity Theorem
The following Sanity Theorem demonstrates that constructive truth/falsity satisfy natural
desired properties. The main idea of these notions is to provide constructive BHK-style
refinement of the classical truth values of arithmetical formulas which respects arithmeti-
cal provability and refutability3. The list of these natural properties corresponds to 1–5 of
Sanity Theorem. Motivations for items 1–3 are straightforward, item 4 is a non-triviality
requirement, item 5 shows that constructive truth/falsity respect arithmetical provability
internally, at the level of provable implications.
Note that other natural BHK-inspired formalizations of constructively true/false do
not seem to pass this sanity test. For example, taking PA ⊢ ✷¬✷F for “F is constructively
false” does not satisfy 2 with ⊥ as F .
Theorem 2 [Sanity Theorem]
1. PA ⊢ F yields “F is constructively true”;
3Formula F is refutable if PA ⊢ ¬F .
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2. PA ⊢ ¬F yields “F is constructively false”;
3. “constructively true” and “constructively false” are mutually exclusive;
4. “constructively true/false” do not coincide with “provable/refutable”;
5. “constructively true” and “constructively false” are monotone in the Lindenbaum
algebra of PA: if PA ⊢ F→G, then
• “F is constructively true” yields “G is constructively true,”
• “G is constructively false” yields “F is constructively false.”
Proof.
1. By definitions, PA ⊢ F iff “F is constructively true.”
2. Let PA ⊢ ¬F . Then PA ⊢ ✷¬F and, by modal-style reasoning, PA ⊢ ✷F→✷⊥.
Note that if F is constructively true, then, by 2, ¬F is constructively false. However,
if F is constructively false, then ¬F can be either constructively true (e.g., when F is
0 = 1), or constructively false (e.g., when F is ¬R from Theorem 4), or neither (e.g., F
is ConPA, by Lemma 2 and Theorem 3).
3. Suppose F is constructively true and false. Then PA ⊢ F and PA ⊢ ✷F → ✷⊥,
hence PA ⊢ ✷F and PA ⊢ ✷⊥ which contradicts soundness of PA with respect to the
standard model.
4. It suffices to find a formula which is true (hence not refutable) but constructively
false.
Lemma 2 Consistency formula ConPA = ¬✷⊥ is true and constructively false.
Proof. ConPA is true in the standard model since PA is sound, hence consistent. Further-
more, since, by the formalized Lo¨b’s Theorem (cf. [10, 27]),
PA ⊢ ✷¬✷⊥→✷⊥,
ConPA is constructively false.
✷
So, ConPA is constructively false but not refutable.
5. In the Lindenbaum algebra of PA,
[G]  [F ] ⇔ PA ⊢ F→G,
constructive truth is closed downward (immediate) and constructive falsehood is closed
upward. Indeed, suppose PA ⊢ F → G, then PA ⊢ ✷F → ✷G. If, in addition, G is
constructively false, then PA ⊢ ✷G→✷⊥ which yields PA ⊢ ✷F→✷⊥ as well. ✷
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6.3 Inconsistency is not constructively false.
Theorem 3 Inconsistency ¬ConPA = ✷⊥ is false, but not constructively false.
Proof. Immediate from Normal Form Theorem 1, since PA 6⊢ ✷✷⊥→✷⊥: otherwise, by
Lo¨b’s Theorem, PA ⊢ ✷⊥ which is not the case.
✷
So, inconsistency formula ¬ConPA is neither constructively false, nor constructively true.
6.4 Rosser sentences
By Rosser’s Theorem, there is a sentence R, for which independence in PA follows from
simple consistency of PA: if PA is consistent, then nether R nor its negation ¬R is provable,
cf. [26].
Theorem 4 Rosser sentence R and its negation ¬R are both constructively false.
Proof. The proof of Rosser’s Theorem is syntactic and can be formalized in PA, cf. [30]:
PA ⊢ ¬✷⊥→ (¬✷R ∧ ¬✷¬R).
By Normal Form Theorem 1, both R and ¬R are constructively false.
✷
6.5 Constructive liar sentence
Theorem 5 There is a true independent in PA sentence which is not constructively false.
Proof. Using the fixed-point lemma, find an arithmetic sentence L such that
PA ⊢ L↔ “L is constructively false.”
Formally,
PA ⊢ L↔ (✷L→✷⊥). (14)
If PA ⊢ L, then PA ⊢ ✷L and, by (14), PA ⊢ ✷⊥ which is not the case.
If PA ⊢ ¬L, then, by Sanity Theorem item 2, L is constructively false, hence, PA ⊢
✷L→✷⊥. By the fixed point (14), PA ⊢ L - a contradiction in PA. So, L is independent
and not constructively false.
Note that L is classically true: otherwise ✷L is false and ✷L→✷⊥ is vacuously true.
By the fixed point (14), L ought to be true as well.
✷
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6.6 Summary table of classical and constructive truth/falsity
Here is the summary table of possible overlaps of classical and constructive truth/falsity.
Intersection of classes Example
True and constructively true 0=0
True and constructively false ConPA, R
True and neither Constructive Liar L
False and constructively true ∅
False and constructively false 0=1, ¬R
False and neither ¬ConPA
6.7 Constructive truth/falsity of dual pairs
Consider dual pairs of arithmetical sentences F and ¬F . If one of them is constructively
true, hence provable, then the other one is refutable, hence constructively false.
We show that any combinations of “constructively false” (we call it case f) and “nei-
ther constructively true nor constructively false” (case n) are possible for dual pairs of
arithmetical sentences.
Case {f, f} is realized by Rosser sentences R and ¬R, cf. Theorem 4.
Case {f, n}, subcase “F is true” is realized by F = ConPA, cf. Lemma 2 and Theorem 3.
Let us do case {f, n}, subcase “F is false.”
Lemma 3 There is an arithmetical sentence F which is false and constructively false
whereas ¬F is neither constructively true nor constructively false.
Proof. Consider F = ¬✷⊥ ∧✷✷⊥. In a different notation, F is nothing but
ConPA ∧ ¬ConPA+ConPA.
F is false, since ✷✷⊥ is false.
F is constructively false. By Normal Form Theorem 1, it suffices to check that PA ⊢
✷F →✷⊥. Argue in PA: ✷F implies ✷¬✷⊥ which, by the formalized Lo¨b’s Theorem,
yields ✷⊥.
¬F is neither constructively true nor constructively false. Indeed, in PA, ¬F is equiv-
alent to ✷✷⊥→✷⊥ which is not provable in PA, since otherwise, by Lo¨b’s Theorem PA
would prove ✷⊥. Therefore, ¬F is not constructively true.
To check that ¬F is not constructively false, it suffices to prove that PA 6⊢ ✷¬F→✷⊥.
In PA, ✷¬F is equivalent to ✷(✷✷⊥→ ✷⊥), which, by the formalized Lo¨b’s Theorem
and some modal-style reasoning in PA is equivalent to ✷✷⊥. So, the problem has been
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reduced to checking that ✷✷⊥→✷⊥ is not derivable in PA. If it were, then, by Lo¨b’s
Theorem, PA would derive ✷⊥ which is not the case. ✷
Let us now do case {n, n}.
Lemma 4 There is an arithmetical sentence F such that both F and ¬F are neither
constructively true nor constructively false.
Proof. It suffices to find F such that both F and ¬F are not constructively false, by the
aforementioned discussion in this section, then neither F nor ¬F can be constructively
true. So, by Normal Form Theorem 1, we need to find an F such that PA 6⊢ ✷F →✷⊥
and PA 6⊢ ✷¬F→✷⊥.
To find such an F , we use the technique developed within the framework of the
Provability Logic GL, cf. [4, 10, 27]. In particular, we will need the uniform arithmetical
completeness theorem for GL established independently in [1, 7, 9, 23, 29].
Lemma 5 [Uniform Arithmetical Completeness of Provability Logic] There is an arith-
metical interpretation ∗ such that for any modal formula M ,
GL ⊢M iff PA ⊢M∗.
Lemma 6 GL 6⊢ ✷p→✷⊥ and GL 6⊢ ✷¬p→✷⊥ for a propositional letter p.
Proof. By soundness of GL with respect to arithmetical interpretations, it suffices to
deliver arithmetical sentences X and Y such that PA 6⊢ ✷X→✷⊥ and PA 6⊢ ✷¬Y →✷⊥.
Obviously, X = ⊥ → ⊥ and Y = ¬X work: they both reduce to showing that PA 6⊢
✷(⊥→⊥)→✷⊥ which is equivalent to PA 6⊢ ✷⊥ and obvious.
✷
By Lemma 5, there is an arithmetical sentence p∗ such that both PA 6⊢ ✷p∗ →✷⊥ and
PA 6⊢ ✷¬p∗→✷⊥.
✷
6.8 Beyond arithmetic
What about constructive consistency of other theories containing PA?
As in Section 3, assume that theory T provably contains PA, ‘✷T ’ and ‘:T ’ denote prov-
ability and proof predicates for T respectively. Consider formulas
• Consistency: ConT = ∀x¬x:T⊥. This is a traditional Go¨delian consistency formula
for T .
• Constructive consistency: CConT = ∀x✷PA¬x:T⊥. This is a formalization of the
case-by-case reading of Hilbert’s desire to have consistency of T proven by finitary
methods.
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• Self-consistency: SConT = ∀x✷T¬x:T⊥. This is a formalization of the idea that a
theory T is able to case-by-case prove its own consistency.
Obviously, CConPA = SConPA.
It is easy to check that PA proves
ConT → CConT → SConT . (15)
By G2, PA 6⊢ ConT .
The following Proposition is a special case of the aforementioned Feferman’s result
concerning reflection principles ([17], Lemma 2.18, cf. also [8], Lemma 2.2(ii)), but we
also provide a proof here to help a general discussion.
Proposition 4 PA ⊢ SConT .
Proof. Indeed, argue in PA.
If ✷T⊥, then vacuously ✷T¬x:T⊥ and hence ∀x✷T¬x:T⊥. Therefore,
✷T⊥ → SConT .
If ¬✷T⊥, then ∀x¬x:T⊥ and, by Σ1-completeness of PA, ∀x✷PA¬x:T⊥. Therefore,
¬✷T⊥ → SConT .
✷
Corollary 1 Any theory containing arithmetic case-by-case proves its consistency.
As we have already noticed earlier, the fact of internal provability of self-consistency
alone does not give a mathematical proof of H-consistency of T which should be a subject
of additional studies. However, Corollary 1 dispels the impossibility of internal consistency
proofs normally attributed to Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem.
In independent private communications after the first version of this work was posted,
Morgan Sinclaire [25] and Taishi Kurahashi [22] have pointed out that CConT is PA-
provably equivalent to
ConPA→ConT
which can be established by the same reasoning as in the proof of Normal Form Theorem 1.
This observation immediately implies Theorem 6 and Corollary 2, both first stated by
Morgan Sinclaire [25].
Theorem 6 PA 6⊢ CConPA+ConPA.
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Proof. Define PA′ as PA+ ConPA. Since, by G2 applied to PA
′,
PA 6⊢ ConPA→ConPA′,
it suffices to establish
PA ⊢ CConPA′→ (ConPA→ConPA′).
Argue in PA. By contrapositive, assume ConPA and ¬ConPA′ . This yields p:PA′⊥ for some
p. By Σ1-completeness, ✷(p:PA′⊥). From ConPA, ¬✷¬(p:PA′⊥) which yields ¬CConPA′:
∃x¬✷¬(x:PA′⊥).
✷
Corollary 2 PA 6⊢ CConT for any T ⊇ PA+ ConPA.
As a corollary, we conclude that, generally speaking, neither of converse implications
from (15) holds. Indeed, for T = PA, PA ⊢ CConT (by Proposition 4), but PA 6⊢ ConT
(by G2). For T = PA + ConPA, PA ⊢ CConT (by Proposition 4), but PA 6⊢ CConT (by
Theorem 6).
It might appear that the results from Section 6.8 preclude the possibility of finitary
proofs of H-consistency of T for theories containing PA + ConPA. However, it is not the
case by the same reason: the internalized universal quantifier in CConT is stronger than
the desired “external” quantifier. Like with G2 and H-consistency, PA 6⊢ CConT but this
does not rule out a series of finitaty proofs p(S) that S is not a T -proof of ⊥.
This also shows that a theory of formalized constructive provability developed in
Section 6 though providing a refined analysis of arithmetical truth and falsity does not
actually address foundational questions of Hilbert’s program.
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